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Leedes: Reasonable Expectations and the Concept of Due Process Law

REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS AND THE CONCEPT
OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW
GARY C. LEEDESO
INTRODUCTION

Slogans about judicial restraint, judicial activism, and the Supreme Court's
role in a political democracy do not decide hard cases; judges do. A careful
evaluation by judges of the interests of groups and individuals should precede
their case rulings. An evaluation of competing interests involves assigning
relative weights to privileges, liberties, rights, duties and governmental goals.
These difficult judgments involve judicial discretion, which is considered a
worrisome variable in constitutional cases. It is claimed that judges ought to be
objective and should not decide cases subjectively. This claim, however, is not
self-explanatory. Indeed, the concepts of objectivity and subjectivity are often
used rhetorically; they have become non-edifying slogans that serve in lieu of an
intellectually stimulating theory of constitutional law.
This article is about judicial discretion, the due process concept, society's
basic values, an individual's reasonable expectations, and his rights. I develop
a conventional theory that describes and explains the case law and the Supreme
Court's methodology in substantive due process cases. Conventional theory is
distinguishable from radical or skeptical scholarly advocacy. Radicals advocate
theories of substantive justice often that are incompatible with the Constitution. Skeptics tend to advocate judicial restraint even when politically accountable officials outrageously violate their trust. Moreover, both radicals and
skeptics doubt the competence of the Supreme Court to interpret the Constitution impartially. In contrast, the conventional approach to constitutional law
developed in this article considers judges adequately objective when they
conscientiously attempt to discern whether trustworthy evidence or precedent
identifies social norms with constitutional significance. The conventional
theorist describes how textual meaning changes over time, and how the due
process clauses acquire content from each new case ruling.
Some contemporary scholars disparage the Constitution as an empty
symbol., I argue, however, that constitutionalism can prevent a representative
democracy from degenerating into representative despotism. To achieve this
end, judges must justify their values with reference to the written document
and its philosophical underpinnings, including the presupposition that basic
law is adaptable in accordance with society's evolving basic values. This is the
essence of what has become the due process of law concept. In short, widely
shared and enduring understandings are a legitimate source of substantive due
process rights. The Court must therefore decide whether the harm done to an
*Professor of Law, University of Richmond. B.S.E., 1960, University of Pennsylvania; LL.B.,
1962, Temple University; LL.M., 1973, Harvard University. A revised version of this article will
appear in a forthcoming book by Professor Leedes entitled THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION.
1. See, e.g., Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017, 1024 (1981).
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individual's reasonable expectations by governmental action is disproportionate to the government's pursuit of public purposes.2
The Supreme Court's institutional role authorizes it to prevent the government of the day from arbitrarily depriving individuals of their legitimate
constitutional rights, which are grounded upon their reasonable expectations
discerned from traditionally respected social norms. In hard cases, the Court's
function is to "mediate, to accommodate, [and] to cushion,"3 the effects of
democracy run riot, and to otherwise resolve the conflict presented by an
aggrieved rightholder's challenge to governmental action that substantially
furthers important community goals. Although some judicial activism in the
service of human rights is inevitable, the Court's institutional role usually requires it to defer to politically accountable officials.
In performing its authorized functions, the Supreme Court has no warrant
to instigate and effectuate radical social transformation, nor, absent a dear
command in the Constitution, has it a duty to require rigid adherence to the
status quo when the government is moving in good faith toward a new conception of economic social justice. Judges lack the expertise, the wherewithal,
and the legal warrant for economic policymaking. Judges also lack the popular
support necessary for effectuating transformation of society's values. Radical
social transformation should come from sources of power external to the
judicial system. The conventional theory developed in this article describes the
adaptive nature of the American legal system; explains that the Supreme
Court's essential role is to secure constitutionally significant, reasonable expectations of the community, which vary over time and which influence the
normative meaning of the Constitution; and, explains why judges are unauthorized to either rubberstamp the political outcomes of a representative
government, or to do everything they can get away with, to nullify, morally
flawed political outcomes.
The Court should reject views of extremists who advocate legalistic and unrealistic dogma, entailing either excessive activism in routine substantive due
process cases, or abdication in all substantive due process cases. Conventional
jurists prefer repealable legislation to adjudicative models granting judges unfettered discretion to constitutionalize their own values. A line between
constitutional law and an elitist judge's peculiar moral principles is necessary.
Judicially imposed policymaking should therefore be distinguished from conventional methods of interpretation that extract the contemporary meaning of
the Constitution from the reasonable expectations of society - the public's
basic values.
Important and substantial changes in the Constitution's meaning have occured because the document's more indeterminate principles are capable of
growth. Although principles can be reformulated by judges, Professor MacCormick warns that a judge "incurs a duty to resolve disputes coming before
2. See also Cox, Book Review, 94 HARv. L. REv. 700, 706 (1981) ("One way or another
* the Court is always deciding whether in its judgment the harm done to the dis-

advantaged class by the legislative classification is disproportionate to the public purposes the
measure is likely to achieve.").
.

Freund, Social Justice and the Law, in SoCIAL JusrcE 110 (R. Brandt ed. 1962).
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him in accordance with law - not just to arbitrate according to the equity of
an individual case (whatever that might be supposed to mean) nor to conciliate
or procure compromises."4 I adopt MacCormick's statement, but further
recognize that enacted law can become intolerable when the government is
unable to adjust its laws to keep pace with changing social attitudes. When
there is a phobic or otherwise unjustifiable political paralysis, it is occasionally
proper for courts to constitutionalize inchoate principles of law that have a
momentum of respect in the national community and are thus ripe for constitutional recognition.5
In this article I elaborate upon a conventional justification for the Court's
substantive due process agenda. The social individual's reasonable expectations
are a source of basic values and individual rights that give content to the
dynamic principles of the Constitution. Part I reveals the roots of substantive
due process and introduces the notion of reasonable expectations. Part II explains why it is appropriate to confine substantive due process to reasonable
expectations. In Part III, the relationship between liberty and reasonable
expectations is exposed. Part IV further develops the substantive due process
agenda under the reasonable expectations standard. In Part V, a methodology
for implementing the reasonable expectations standard in due process cases is
introduced. Finally, Part VI explores the challenging implications of due
process methodology.
PART I: RooTs

The decline of the Marshall Court's vested rights doctrine and the rise of
positivism did not preclude the courts from taking an active role in government.
By virtue of the Court's substantive due process doctrine, certain inchoate
principles of the Constitution continue to protect society's reasonable expectations against intolerable and arbitrary government actions. The antecedents
of the modern substantive due process doctrine can be traced to Calderv. Bull,
wherein Justice Chase wrote:
The people of the United States erected their constitutions or forms of
government, to establish justice, to promote the general welfare, to secure
the blessings of liberty, and to protect their persons and property from
violence. The purposes for which men enter into society will determine
the nature and terms of the social compact; and as they are the foundations of the legislative power, they will decide what are the proper objects
of [the legislative power]. 6
Human beings who abide by the social compact expect civilized decency from
their government. 7 Justice Chase's views were commonplace when the Republic
4. N. MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 242 (1978).
5. Accumulating judicial precedent can displace ossified law that remains in force only
because of obvious political malfunctions in certain states. This situation existed when the
Court held in Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), that de jure school segregation violated

due process of law.
6. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387-88 (1978).
7. Justice Chase added, "[tihere are certain vital principles in our free republican govern-
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was young, and Calder reflected a basic unwritten tenet of the Constitution:
all powers not positively granted to a free government are reserved to the
people, who will understandably turn to courts of justice when government
shatters their reasonable expectations.
Justice Chase upheld the challenged law in Calder, a demonstration of
judicial restraint on his part. Prudence suggested restraint; the doctrine of
judicial review had not been firmly established. The Calder Court, however,
issued a warning shot that put representative government on notice of the
power of judicial review. Earlier decisions also indicated that courts would
become guardians of individual rights. For example, Justice Paterson, sitting
in the circuit three years earlier in Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance,s had charged
the jury that taking without compensation "isinconsistent with the principles
of reason, justice and moral rectitude; ...is contrary to the principles of the
social alliance in every free government; and.., is contrary both to letter and
spirit of the constitution." 9 On the basis of this charge, an act of the legislature
was pronounced void.'°Calder and Vanhorne's Lessee are examples of reasoning from the premise that not all legislative acts are valid. These cases relied
on a "social alliance" theory as if it were an underpinning of the Constitution.
The social alliance notion refers to the reasonable expectations of the people.
This standard, although variable over time, remains stable enough to provide
an impartial basis for judges to identify the proper objects of legislative power.
In Fletcher v. Peck," Chief Justice Marshall noted the nebulous limits
separating the powers of each branch of government where the Constitution is
silent. 1- Marshall thus suggested that an unwritten doctrine of substantive
rights can be extracted from the separation of powers principles in the Constitution. The Court in Murray v. Hoboken Land Improvement Co."s stated that
the due process clause "cannot be so construed as to leave Congress free to make
any process 'due process of law,' by its mere will."'14 While Murray dealt with
challenged procedures, a landmark state court decision rendered one year
later dealt with an individual's substantive rights. In Wynehamer v. The
People, 5 the state court's reasoning transferred the judiciary's attention further
away from the natural justice, social compact, and separation of powers
doctrines by emphasizing the limits of legislative power imposed by the due
process of law concept.
ments, which will determine and overrule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power,
[that authorizes] manifest injustice by positive law; or [which takes] away that security for
personal liberty, or private property, for the protection whereof the government was established." Id. at 388.

8. 2 U.S. (2 DaUL) 304 (1795).
9. Id. at 310.
10. Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of American ConstitutionalLaw, 12 MicH. L. REV. 247, 25

(1914).
11. 10 US. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
12. The exact quote is as follows: "How far the power of giving the law may involve every
other power, in cases where the constitution is silent, never has been, and perhaps never can
be, definitely stated." Id. at 186.
13. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).

14. Id. at 276.
15.

13 N.Y. 878 (1856).
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Tragic mistakes occur when the Court misreads the people's reasonable
expectations. In 1856, Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott v. Sandford,16 misread the temper of a large part of the country, which was hostile to his own
values. The Chief Justice, referring to an act of Congress, wrote that the legislation "could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law."'' In
most cases, only a rash court will nullify legislation when people are so sharply
divided that no reasonable expectation of due process rights exists. History
suggests that the unwritten principles of justice, including those guaranteed
by the vague due process clauses, cannot be accurately shaped without reference
to the widely shared needs in American society. Expression of these deeply
felt needs by judges attuned to enduring community values can reduce the
tensions between acceptable objective standards and unacceptable judicial subjectivity.
The Court's credible exercise of authority to decide hard cases on the basis
of evocative constitutional provisions depends on its ability to provide persuasive reasons for its holdings. When legitimate principles justify a decision,
judges are not likely to be regarded as elitists imposing purely personal authoritarian ethics. Absent trustworthy evidence of common values held by the diverse
segments of society, deference to the political outcome is appropriate in substantive due process cases.' s

II: CONFINING SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
DOCTRINE TO REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS

PART

The Constitution is a social contract. Historically, the legal concept of a
contract has been "a paradigm . . . [of] justice viewed as the satisfaction of
reasonable expectations."' 9 The Constitution's authors could no more specify
the nature of people's reasonable expectations than can a modem constitutional
law theory. An individual's reasonable expectations vary over time independent
of positive law. The reasonable expectation standard is almost as broad as due
process itself, and both flexible notions are given content by the Court's interaction with a specific social context.2 0 Despite inherent vagaries in the reasonable expectation standard, it is a guide indicating society's basic values.
Attention is drawn away from the judge's subjective feelings and toward
the government's constitutional obligation when officials arbitrarily interfere
with a litigant's reasonable expectations. The reasonableness of a litigant's
16. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
17. Id. at 450.
18. Not all commentators agree with this proposition. See, e.g., Brest, The Fundamental
Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictionsof Normative ConstitutionalScholarship, 90
YALE L. J. 1063 (1981).
19. Freund, supra note 3, at 93 & 95. In referring to the development of English common
law, Freund writes: "[Clontract is seen as the progeny of property and tort: the elements of
both quid pro quo and reliance entered into its inheritance, and its ancestry may flow back to
the unifying idea of the satisfaction of reasonable expectations." Id. at 96 (footnotes omitted).
20. However, judges may not do as they please. As Professor Tushnet notes, "a substantive
due process right should be established only to the extent [it is] supported by the weight of
responsible opinion. Tushnet, The Newer Property: Suggestion for the Revival of Substantive
Due Process, 1975 Sup. CT.R~v. 261, 279.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1983

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [1983], Art. 3
1983]

REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS/DUE PROCESS OF LAW

expectation is determined with reference to positive law, custom, the framers'
intent, and tradition. These data exist independently of the judge's own
partisan political opinions. In short, the reasonable expectation standard is an
organizing principle with an empirical basis and objective character which
21
justifies setting aside a political outcome.
The reasonable expectation standard has further merit because it does not
grant constitutional significance to all important human rights. The human
rights concept is powerful, 22 too powerful to be safely entrusted to courts that
employ techniques of legal reasoning without regard to the potentially disruptive impact on society. A judge is not a sage who knows people better than they
know themselves. Forcing "human rights" upon people who are unprepared
for radical normative change is inconsistent with the reasonable expectation
standard. Such would be a monstrous doctrine equating what a community
would choose if it were "morally virtuous" (when it is not), with what it ac23
tually seeks and chooses.
There is another reason why the substantive due process doctrine is dependent upon the reasonable expectations standard. Substantive due process
protects liberties which compete with concepts of equality. Liberty and
equality are ultimately imperialistic; 24 as they expand in scope, the tension
between them increases. In short, there are some irresolvable contradictions in
the Constitution. The Court, at best, can effectuate a transient accommodation-a of competing values by adjusting tensions on a case-by-case basis. 26 The
reasonable expectations standard gives a semblance of objectivity and unity to
the entire enterprise.
The reasonable expectations of the national community might have little
to do with the coherence theories of rigid philosophers. Indeed, the judge who
21. Freund notes that the reasonable expectation standard "is, to be sure a protean
concept, but its vagueness has boundaries: it is to be differentiated, on the one hand, from
generosity or mercy; on the other, from will or power. Moreover, it connotes rational
principles of measure and order." See Freund, supra note 3, at 96.
22. Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the ConstitutionalRight to Privacy: A Case Study in
Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 961 (1979).
23. 1. BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in Four ESSAYS ON LmaR 145-54 (1970). As
Berlin writes, "[t]his is the argument used by every dictator, inquisitor, and bully who seeks
some moral justification for his conduct." Id. at 150-51. The technique of the bully is hardly
the way to avoid the countermajoritarian difficulty.
24. See J. PENNOCK, DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL THEORY 16-50, 58 (1979).
25. See id. at 17.
26. Sir Norman Anderson writes:
The basic problem is where to draw the line, or how to maintain a proper balance
between individual liberty and legal control. Even those who prize their freedom most
highly should be prepared to accept such restrictions as can be seen to be both necessary and just. But there can be no synthesis of liberty and law without justice; for in
the last resort it is only justice that can be the arbiter of the circumstances and extent to
which law may encroach on liberty, particularly in an era characterized by a widespread demand that everyone should be free to go his own way, on the one hand, and
by an unprecedented spate of legislative regulations, on the other.

N.

ANDERSON, LmERTY, LAwv AND JusncE

7 (1978).
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relies solely on sterile logic is likely to be insensitive when traditional legal
reasoning is inadequate to resolve a difficult case. The sensitive judge will
"enter upon a regressive inquiry into the antecedent postulates of the system of
rules which he is applying."27 The latter judge will often find that the reasonable expectation standard is a legitimate ground for his ruling, even though the
pattern of rulings may turn out to be a logician's nightmare.
A pragmatic accommodation of competing interests may be perceived by
moral perfectionists as flawed. The minimum essentials of substantive due process fall short of idealistic theories of social justice because any lack of societal
unity and constancy makes coherent ordering of due process values an impractical judicial undertaking. Unacceptable social change is not likely to be
imposed upon society by a disciplined judge who adheres to the public's
shared values.
The reasonable expectations limitation on judicial power is thus a practical
28
standard, contemplating the coexistence of individual rights and social justice.
The approach also constrains both electorally accountable officials and unelected federal judges. The reasonable expectation standard, however, does not
liberate a judge from the constraints of constitutionalism. As Professor Hart
writes, "there still remains a distinction between a constitution which, after
setting up a system of courts, provides that the law shall be whatever the su... 29
preme court thinks fit, and the actual constitution of the United States.
Kent Greenawalt adds:
Obviously the law provides the main criteria for judges interpreting the
Constitution . . . . Although a court's judgment may be influenced by
moral evaluation, rarely, if ever, is the determination a straightforward
one about moral acceptability or moral right; the court will be guided
by whatever implicit judgments of acceptability are contained in or
underlie the relevant constitutional provision and precedents interpreting it, and often it will grant considerable deference to the judgments
made by the political branches. 30
Any theory of justice that derogates from the authoritative status of the Constitution cannot be justified as a valid interpretation of the due process clauses.
To ascertain what process is "due," the judge looks outside the document
to give meaning to this prescription. The notion that the political norms of the
27. Freund, supra note 3, at 109-10.
28. Berlin notes: "'Freedom for the pike is death for the minnows'; the liberty of some
must depend on the restraint of others." I. BER.IN, supra note 23, at 124.
29. H. HART, THE CONCEPT oi. LAW 141 (1961). Hart adds:
[J]udges, even those of a supreme court, are parts of a system the rules of which are
determinate enough at the center to supply standards of correct judicial decision. These
are regarded by courts as something which they are not free to disregard in the exercise
of the authority to make those decisions which cannot be challenged within the system.
Id. at 141-42.
80. Greenawalt, Conflicts of ZLaw and Morality - Institutions of Amelioration, 67 VA. L.
REv. 177, 210 (1981).
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"real majority" can be discerned by judges is troublesome. Without doubt, the
reasonable expectations standard poses risks when used by judges who are
insulated from political contact with the people. However, it is equally
troublesome when, owing to a sudden swing of popular obsession, a transient
majority arbitrarily enacts laws offensive to the public's reasonable expectations
of fairness. Such deviations from society's prevailing norms violate the fairness
component of the due process concept, which protects individuals from democratic despotism.
The people must be protected against despotic judges who arbitrarily invalidate political outcomes under color of law. In outrageous cases, impeachment is one congressional option. Alternatively, Congress should enact legislation to encourage attorneys to challenge controversial rulings when empirical
data discloses that the Court's justification for its holding rests upon a false perception of society's reasonable expectations. Such legislation would permit
reference to congressional findings of fact disclosing its perceptions of the
social norms. An examination of Congress' findings could induce the Court to
admit that its precedent is based upon mistaken assumptions of fact.
A conscientious Court will overrule its precedent to correct its mistaken
factual assumptions about society's reasonable expectations.3 ' This suggestion,
however drastic, reconciles the due process concept with the separation of
powers doctrine. Separation of powers protects politically accountable officials
from autocratic judges. Inchoate in the separation of powers concept is a
system of checks and balances, preventing each branch from usurping powers reserved to the people by the ninth and tenth amendments. The Court, of course,
has the ultimate power to define and articulate legal standards for the resolution
of article III cases. On the other hand, congressional findings of fact about the
practices and aspirations of the American people would be entitled to respect
if based rationally on adequate, trustworthy evidence.s2
PART III: ON LiERTY
It is commonplace in modem procedural due process cases to identify
liberties protected by the Constitution. 33 This practice, however, should not
become a positive law trap 34 requiring a court to hold that liberties lack
31. If the Court unjustifiably defies Congress by insisting dogmatically on its own erroneous findings of fact, further remedial legislation will be appropriate. Congress acting in
good faith can supplement its remedial legislation with a provision that strips the Supreme
Court of appellate jurisdiction to substitute its judgment for congressional findings of empirical facts. See U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 2. Some commentators have questioned the legitimacy
of this approach. See, e.g., Auerbach, The Unconstitutionality of Congressional Proposals to
Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 47 Mo. L. REv. 47 (1982); Estreicher, Congressional

Power and Constitutional Rights: Reflections on Proposed "Human Life" Legislation, 68
VA. L. REv. 333 (1982); Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term- Foreword: Constitutional
Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95
HAtv. L.REv. 17 (1981).
32. Cox, Congress v. The Supreme Court, 33 MNRcEmt L. REv. 710-12 (1982); Leedes, State
Action Limitations on Courts and CongressionalPower, 60 N.C.L. REv. 747, 779-82 (1982).
33. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710-12 (1976).
34. See Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61
B.UJ. REv.885, 888 (1981) (Mashaw develops the concept of the "positive law trap').
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constitutional status unless they have first been recognized by a state or the
federal government. The dictionary defines liberty as "[t]he condition of
being not subject to restriction or control."35 This definition "refers to the
absence of interference with one's ability to do what one wills."36 While individuals have desires that lack constitutional significance; the Court, by a
process of inclusion and exclusion, gives content and scope to the liberties that
are embraced by the substantive due process concept. Gerald Gunther describes
the Court's view of liberty when the policy of politically accountable officials
is challenged:
In the substantive due process cases, the Court adopted a very embracive
view of the individual in terests encompassed by the term "liberty." From
Allgeyer 3 7 through Lochner3s to Meyer v. Nebraska,39 the old Court extended "liberty" far beyond the freedom from physical restraint. And
40
that legacy has not been disavowed by the modern Court: Griswold,
41
Roe, and their progeny have been increasingly uninhibited in explicitly
building upon the Lochner era's broad view of liberty. True, Justices
have differed about what aspects of liberty are sufficiently "fundamental"
to warrant special scrutiny by the Court. But those differences ...

have

been accompanied by a widespread consensus that "liberty" includes just
about every interest of significance to an individual - or, more accurately, that the phrase "life, liberty or property" in the due process
clauses is "a unitary concept embracing all interests valued by sensible
men.' 42 In the substantive due process area, in short, the typical Court
focus has not been on whether a constitutionally protected interest has
the
been impinged upon, but rather on what amount of justification
43
state must put forth to defend that impingement successfully.
The Court, therefore, should conscientiously evaluate whether the challenged
governmental action is either arbitrary, or compatible with the principles that
have force in the social alliance.
The difficult task is to determine whether the furtherance of legitimate and
substantial governmental purposes justifies the impingement on liberty. I
suggest there may be inviolable core liberties. More commonly, however, the
question is whether a conditional liberty is violated, a question requiring the
Court to articulate and utilize a flexible balancing approach. After a series of
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 753 (1969).
J. PENNOCK, supra note 24, at 19.
37. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (Court invalidated state statute which
infringed upon the liberty to contract for insurance).
38. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (Court relied on liberty of contract
premises to invalidate legislation restricting hours worked by bakers).
35.

36.

39. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (Court equated liberties having constitutional significance with "privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men").
40. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Court held that state statute violated the
liberty to use contraceptives in the privacy of the marital bedroom).
41. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (Court held that the right of privacy recognized
in prior cases was "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate
her pregnancy").

42.
43.

Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property",62 CORNELL L. Ray. 405, 409 (1977).
G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 647 (10th ed. 1980).
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issues has been resolved by the Court's flexible approach, it is possible to
formulate a doctrine which unconditionally protects particular aspects of
liberty. Initially, it is necessary to discuss the basis for the norm requiring the
government to articulate its purposes when its action is challenged in court.
When the government deprives an individual of liberty without justification, it is claiming that it can be as arbitrary as it pleases, notwithstanding the
individual's expectations. The government's failure to justify a deprivation of
liberty is worse than arbitrary; it treats a human being as "some featureless
amalgam, a statistical unit without identifiable, specifically human features
and purposes of [its] own."4 4 When the Court condones the government's
action without any purposeful inquiry, the potential is frightening for a free
people.
When a presumptively constitutional statute is challenged on substantive
grounds, the Court cannot intelligently and carefully determine whether the
litigant has rebutted the presumption unless the government indicates the
statute's purpose. The rationality requirement only makes sense when the
Court does not rubber stamp an apparently purposeless statute. Whether a
means-end instrumental relationship is required, or whether this rationality requirement can be satisfied by a non-instrumental, intuitively plausible explanation,4 5 some rationality requirement ought to obtain in the routine case. If no
governmental justification is required, the Court necessarily ignores the reasonable expectations of people.
Each litigant has a reasonable expectation not to be deprived arbitrarily of
life, liberty and property. Therefore, due process guarantees the right to
demand official justification showing the deprivation is instrumentally or
intuitively rational. The rationality standard requires a showing that the
official body was aware of what governmental action was taken; that it intended to take that action in the sense of envisaging it; and, that it wanted
the action to be taken either for its own sake or for the sake of achieving some
stated goal. Without such a showing, the government's legal position is unintelligible and intolerable because the litigant is deprived not only of his
liberty but his sense of being a respected individual in the community. 46 The
notion of a dialogue47 between the government and the individual defines
civilized decency and a liberal's conception of liberty in a free society.
The frontiers of liberty are ever shifting, 48 the minimum essentials of
freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" 49 will thus vary over time.
BERUN, supra note 23, at 155.
See generally Leedes, The Rationality Requirement of the Equal Protection Clause, 42
ST.L.J. 639 (1981) (means-end scrutiny of judicial review in equal protection cases).

44. I.
45.
OHIO

46. This notion of substantive due process rights is not at war with man's basic sociability,
but reinforces the eighteenth century tradition that "the concept of an individual is coherent only in the context of social existence." Mashaw, supra note 34, at 930.
47. See B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LmRA STATE 358-59 (1980).
48. However, "there are certain personal matters in which each person should be free to
decide what should happen, and in choices over these things whatever he or she thinks is
better must be taken to be better for the society as a whole, no matter what others think." I.
BERLIN, Introduction to FouR ESSAYS ON LmuRTY at liii (1970).
49. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
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It is impractical, if not impossible, to identify the shifting frontier of substantive liberties protected by the due process concept without references to
"quasi-empirical"50 data providing the basis of a litigant's reasonable expectations.
In the United States, the reasonable expectations of liberty fall short of
John Stuart Mill's conception that liberty means the least restraint on freedom
compatible with the liberty of others. 51 Pursuant to the Millian notion, one
might argue that he has a right to liberty "X", since liberty "X" does not violate a specific duty to the public or hurt any individual; thus, it is a right that
society can "afford to bear for the sake of the greater good of human freedom. ' 52 Mill's critics "point out that the limits of private and public domain
are difficult to demarcate; that anything a man does, could, in principle,
frustrate others, that no man is an island; that the social and the individual
aspects of human beings often cannot in practice, be disentangled." 53 Millian
rights often clash with community values, and frequently yield to a more pragmatic quasi-empirical conception of liberty. In other words, judicial review
of the government's power to abridge liberty may require the Court to balance
54
competing individual and community interests.
The tension between individual liberty and the competing interests cannot
be permanently resolved by reasoning from Mill's principles of liberty5 5 The
individual is often essentially ambivalent. For example, an individual may
simultaneously desire privacy and association, both of which are essential to his
development,5 6 but association with the community interferes with his privacy,
autonomy, and liberty. 57 If resulting tensions are resolved by recognizing the
50. I. BERLIN, supra note 48, at iv.
51. "The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of
a civilized community against his will is to prevent harm to others." H. HART, LAw, LIBERTY,
AND MORALITY 4 (1962) (quoting J. MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859)).
52. I. BERLIN, John Stuart Mill and the Ends of Life, in FouR EssAYs ON LmERTY 196
(1970).
53. Id. at 191.
54. See Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 690 (1980). Professor Karst writes:
Conventional morality influences the judicial process in constitutional cases in two
different but related ways. First . . . it is taken into account in developing doctrinethat is, in determining the weights to be assigned in a process of constitutional interest
balancing, and particularly those on the state's-interest side of the balance. Second,
the judiciary is influenced by conventional morality in assessing the relevance to a particular case of its own position in a system of separation of powers.
Id.
55. R. NozicK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 471 (1981). Robert Nozick writes: "It is not
part of our view that all the modulations of moral responsiveness are captured by or are best
produced by following formulatable principles." Id.
56. J. PENNOCK, supra note 24, at 116.
57. Berlin writes:
[T]he problem of how an over-all increase of liberty in particular circumstances is to
be secured, and how it is to be distributed ... in situations ... in which the opening
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priority of enacted law, individual liberties are subordinated perhaps arbitrarily. s Conversely, if individual liberties always have priority, the societal
interests of order, stability, and conventional morality are sacrificed perhaps
unnecessarily.
Mill's preference for liberty exceeds the modest guarantees of the due process
concept. Mill wanted not a minimum, but a maximum of non-interference
consonant with demands of society. 5 Mill, however, had no conception of
what the future would bring, "neither of the political and social consequences
of industrialization, nor of the discovery of the strength of irrational and unconscious factors in human behavior... ... 60 Thus, the modem court's mission
to protect individuals' liberties is more complicated than Mill's political
agenda. Unlike Millian liberties, the minimum essentials of liberty shift, depending on society's reasonable expectations about stability, order and other
interests.
PART IV: THE COMPLICATED NATURE OF THE
SuBSTANTIvE

DUE

PROCESS AGENDA

The following section will survey some of the political complications associated with the Court's controversial substantive due process doctrine. After
a brief discussion of the Court's limited role, the focus will shift to a criticism
of consequentialism in hard cases. Reasonable expectations will be suggested as
a viable alternative to this teleological approach. Finally, morality and reasonable expectations will be explored with emphasis on their appropriate use in
the birth control cases and their subsequent abuse in Roe v. Wade.0 ' The objective is to establish a legitimate political agenda for the Court.
A Limited JudicialRole
In our representative democracy, the Supreme Court's legitimate political
agenda is limited. The nature of the Court's limited role is not always captured
by discussions about abstract constitutional rights. Legislatures, not federal
judges, are answerable directly to the people. As Justice Frankfurter wrote, the
"Court's only and very narrow function is to determine whether within the
broad grant of authority vested in legislatures they have exercised a judgment
for which reasonable justification can be offered." 62 Although the Court's power
as the guardian of the Constitution is formidable in a democracy known for
its litigious citizens, the legislatures are equally important guardians of liberty.63
of one door leads to the lifting of other barriers... how, in a word the maximization
of opportunities is in any concrete case to be achieved, can be an agonizing problem,
not to be solved by any hard-and-fast rule.
I. BERTIN, supra note 48, at xviii-xix.
58. Mashaw, supra note 34, at 909.
59. I. BERLIN, supra note 23, at 161.
60. Id. at 183.

61. 410 US. 113 (1973).
62. West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 649 (1943) (Frankfurter, j.,

dissenting).
63.

Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. of Tex. v. May, 194 US. 267, 270 (1904) (Holmes, J.)
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The Court's consideration of political issues inevitably raises separation of
power concerns. As early as 1787 it was asked, "if the judiciary acts as a check
on the legislature, then who is to act as a check on the judiciary?"64 Today, one
commentator notes, "[g]overnment by judiciary will fail ... because its present
success . . . exalts autocracy over democracy . . . faction over society, equality
over liberty... and even mindlessness over reason."6 5 The legal profession keeps
its critical eye on the Court. The peer pressure has a salutory impact, tending to
restrain judicial autocracy.
The profession should not ask the impossible of the Court. No theory of
constitutional law, except one that counsels deference across the board, can
completely eliminate judicial subjectivity. While mechanistic formulas of
judicial restraint can eliminate discretion, such insensitively rigid formulas
disable the Court when it attempts to respond to society's deeply felt values.
The empirical reasonable expectation standard, however, responds to both state
autonomy and self-government concerns and yields a plausible justification for
judicial rulings.
Judicial activism is justified when individuals are victimized arbitrarily by
representatives ignoring accepted notions of fundamental fairness. Increased
participation by powerless segments of the society does not eliminate the
problem of "captured" 6G legislatures. Furthermore, increased participation by
larger segments of the public does not solve the problems of pluralism; there
are simply more axes to grind. A legislature, quite as much as a court, is
legally obligated to exercise deliberate and sensible judgment. Although the
Court is a necessary link between citizen and government, when the judiciary's
concerns with substantive justice involve repetitious intervention in routine
cases, "the style of legal discourse approaches that of commonplace political or
economic argument." 6' 7 Steady doses of instrumental rationality68 in routine
cases involves the Supreme Court in prospective policymaking. It is therefore
incumbent upon the Court to exercise self-restraint in what Chief Justice Stone
called the "run-of-the-mill" due process case. 69
Teleologic considerations may be appropriate in hard cases when no rules,
principles or analogies are dispositive, and when counsel's consequentialist
argument persuasively tips the balance of competing considerations toward one
ruling rather than another.7 0 Consequentialist considerations, however, can
ultimately undermine and destroy rights. 7'1 Rawls recognizes the subversive
("[I]t must be remembered that legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the courts.").
64. R. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC 8
(1970).
65. Kurland, Government by Judiciary, 2 U. ARK. L.J. 307, 320 (1979).
66. See Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory- And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223,
243 (1981).
67. R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 199 (1976).
68. Id. Purposive legal reasoning tends to be "characterized by the predominance of
instrumental rationality over other modes of thought." Id.
69. Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to Charles Evans Hughes (Apr. 19, 1938), quoted in

A.

MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAw
70. N. MACCORMICK, supra note 4, at 227-28.

71.

514 (1956).

C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 8-9 (1978).
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tendencies of teleologic theories that define the good "independently from the
' 72
right, and then the right is defined as that which maximizes the good."
These theories, he contends, allow a determination of goodness without
reference to rightness.7 3 A purely consequentialist approach does not enable
judges to take seriously enough the reasonable expectations of persons, and
the "distinction between persons." 74 The implications of utilitarian consequentialism authorize the judge to sacrifice just claims whenever beneficial
consequences outweigh harm to the litigant. 5
A system of judicial review is not, strictly speaking, rights-oriented or
principled when the crucial "legal" issue is a determination of the best consequences. Aside from the intractable questions in many cases (best consequences
for whom?), evaluating all the possible consequences takes judges beyond their
field of competence, which is not forecasting the future. Moreover, judges are
likely to give undue weight to immediate considerations at the expense of individual and societal reasonable expectations; such expectations, given an opportunity for more dispassionate judgment, have superior normative im7 6

portance.

The reasonable expectations protected by a stable body of law are too often
shattered when courts become primarily calculators of consequences. Furthermore, routine prospective instrumental policymaking, the by-product of excessive consequentialism, subverts the Constitution's distinction between the judiciary and legislature.7 Finally, excessive judicial consequentialism resembles
the "end always justifies the means" rationale fatal to the concept of law.7 8 For
the aforementioned reasons, the judge should not routinely adhere to a consequentialist pattern of decision-making. Although judicial restraint in the
routine cases is proper, a judge needs a theory of judicial intervention.
Toward a Theory of Intervention
How does the judge construct a legitimate theory of intervention, consistent
with the concept of constitutionalism in a representative democracy, that establishes a political agenda for the Court? If the Court does not rely upon
history, tradition, or contemporary consensus for its sources of values, it is
dangerously adrift without moorings. If the Court does rely on such sources,
cases may be decided on the basis of unreliable evidence7 9 Cognizant of the
difficulties in ascertaining society's reasonable expectations, careful judges
rarely will rely upon unpersuasive evidence. Some reasonable expectations have
72. J. RAWLS, A THEoRY or JusTIcE 24 (1971).
73. Id. at 25.
74. Id.at 27.
75. See J. SmART, An Outline of a System of UtilitarianEthics, in UTTARuNISM FOR &
AGAINST 69-73 (1973).
76. J. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG 156 (1977). J. L. Mackie notes,
"[w]e are rightly skeptical about a man of principle who has a new principle for every case.
His decisions are likely to show just that undue deference to what is immediately vivid or
pressing which it is one function of principles to counteract." Id.
77. R. UNGER, KNOWI.EDGE AND POLITICS 90 (1975).
78. C. FIm, supra note 71, at 7-8.
79. See J. ELY, DEMocRAcY AND DSTmusr: A THEoRY oF JUDIcIAL RPvmiw 60-69 (1980).
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deep societal roots. The Court can build upon this foundation of trustworthy
evidence to justify decisions.80
A competent judge should thus be able to recognize when the version of
the framers' intent propounded in counsel's brief is merely slanted law office
history, or when the alleged community consensus is fragmented, shifting, or
unknown. The competent judge should recognize when the traditional values
relied upon by counsel are in fact established patterns of social behavior creating reasonable expectations that deserve due process of law. In short, the
Court need not abandon the case's social context. Although history, tradition
and consensus are controversial and elusive value sources, the Court's credibility
can be established if the evidence it relies upon is clear and convincing. The
fault of poor law office histories lies with the evidentiary quality, not the facts.
Some customary patterns of behavior are so indelibly a part of American
social life that they have constitutional significance.
Tradition, much maligned these days, is an important ingredient of legitimate authority. 81 Tradition reveals patterns of behavior that are deeply impressed in our social fabric. The nation's continued respect for the judiciary
is largely attributable to the judiciary's respect for tradition. Without historical
perspective or respect for tradition, the Court is more likely to mistake the
ripple for the tide, and the fad for essential and enduring societal values. When
an enduring consensus does not exist, deference to the legislature is both
practical and appropriate. No right should be judicially enforceable unless it
comports with society's reasonable expectations. The judge with common
sense is competent to ascertain whether history, tradition, and contemporary
consensus strongly suggest that a particular right has the momentum of
respect.
In a substantive due process case, it is durable community values that have
constitutional significance, irrespective of whether the judge shares these
values. Law and set patterns of morality cannot be kept completely apart for
both are concerned with norms of conduct and justice. 82 The typical judge
80. J. RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL
SYSTEM 115 (2d ed. 1980). Raz believes:

SYSTEM: AN INTRODUcTION TO THE THEORY OF LEGAL

An adequate explanation of law is the best starting point for the explanation of the
common-sense conception of law. The common-sense conception is made clear by explaining its deviation from the theoretical concept. This approach makes it a desideratum of the theoretical concept, of a law that it approximate to the common-sense
concept.
Id.
81. For an excellent elaboration of the concept of tradition from the standpoint of a
sociologist, see E. SHILs, TRADITION (1981). Some samples follow: "Tradition acquired the
bad name which had become attached to dogma." Id. at 5. "Traditionality no more requires
intolerance and dogmatism than do scientism, rationalism, and secularism." Id. "Tradition
...is anything which is transmitted or handed down from the past to the present. It makes
Id.
I..."
at 12. "[Two transmissions over three
no statement about what is handed down .
generations are required for a pattern of belief or action to be considered a tradition." Id.
at 15.
82. See L. FuLLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 130 (rev'd ed. 1969).
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is influenced, at least in part, by the morals and customs of society. When a
judge's pet ideas about the just society are incompatible with the basic values
of the nation, he has no authorization, under the due process clauses, to impose
his ideas upon an unconsenting public.
By contrast, legislation that denies the humanity of an individual, or is a
blatantly absurd mistake in judgment about the general welfare, or dearly
departs from the Constitution's recognized principles, frequently triggers a
higher level of judicial scrutiny. Under these circumstances, the Court may
presume the legislation is offensive to basic societal values. Of course, in many
cases it may be difficult to ascertain whether legislation amounts to the kind
of invidious discrimination or oppression that degrades human dignity. When
there is an evident lack of social agreement on matters of substantive justice,
formal justice becomes important. The venerable practice of treating like cases
alike is usually sound because it provides an orientation for individuals, representatives and judges83 This practice tends to maintain the status quo, and
recognizes that newly emerging rights usually need an incubation period before
incorporating into the Constitution. Formal justice inhibits judicial activism
until a principle of substantive justice is sufficently ripe to support a novel
result. Although the due process concept gradually changes with the ebb and
flow of community morality, judges who change the law first in hopes of changing community morality later take a dangerous shortcut. There are no shortcuts across a trackless ocean.
Formal justice ensures that the penetration of community morality into the
gaps of constitutional law is gradual. Otherwise, the legal system would be in
disorder. In this selective, incremental and disciplined process of adjudication,
only the most appealing inchoate principles of constitutional law based upon
clearly recognizable societal needs are candidates for extraordinary protection
from the Court.
Morality, Reasonable Expectations, and
the Right of Privacy
In the area of community morality, the art of judging becomes controversial
and difficult. The competent jurist is attuned to the litigant's reasonable ex83. Formal justice is one of the major steadying factors in our appellate courts. One may
not predict with certainty the outcome of a particular appeal; one might know, however,
whether to take an appeal or not by calculating the outcome beforehand with some degree
of accuracy. In other words, a lawyer advising a client can explain the nature of the business
risk that is involved if an appeal were to be taken. See, e.g., K. LrwELrYN, TiH COMMON
LAw DECmiING APPEsA 13-19 (1960); Llewellyn, My Philosophy of Law, in My PLmosoPHY or
LAw: CREDOS or SDx-rN AmmxiucAn ScHoLARs 184-86 (1941). For critiques of formal justice, see,
e.g., P. NONLr & P. SELZNicx, LAW AND SociErY iN TRANsrriON: ToWARD RFsPoNsrvE LAW 103

(1978); R. UNGEcR, supra note 77, at 87-88, 103, 184-85, 261; R. UNGER, supra note 67, at 17577; Lyons, The Weakness of Formal Equality, 76 ETics 14648 (1966). There is no difficulty
in disparaging formal justice, or any other legal standard, it has been said, "if we presume
that universal idiocy is conjoined with the standard." Therefore, a theorist should hesitate
before he ridicules formal justice. The court that adheres to formal justice "says ... in effect,
[t]hese are the rules we expect you to follow. If you follow them, you have our assurance that

they are the rules that will be applied to your conduct." L. FuLLER, supra note 82, at 40.
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pectations and the values that have the momentum of respect. The longer a
broad-based moral right has endured, the more likely the Court is to intervene
in the political process. Even so, judges cannot appear to take partisan sides
in political controversies having nothing to do with constitutional principles.
The judge's views of morality may not enter into the law, unless his ruling is
subsumable by an established or inchoate constitutional principle. Otherwise,
the case law can be mistaken for a seamless fusion of law and morality.
Justice Harlan's views in the birth control cases exemplify the process I
have been describing.84 By the 1960's, community morality clearly rejected any
intrusive governmental experiments with "the mode and manner of the
married couple's sexual relations."8s5 This reasonable expectation of privacy
had not yet been introduced into the case law. When the outmoded Connecticut statute that made it a crime for any person, including married persons,
to use contraceptives was tested in Poe v. Ullman,s6 there appeared to be a gap
in constitutional law. Since no other state had ever made the use of contraceptives illegal, s 7 the state's power to regulate the intimacies of married life in
the home required clarification. Although the Court ruled the case nonjusticiable, Justice Harlan in dissent contended the statute encroached upon a traditional "private realm of family life"' 8 more inviolable than liberties dependent upon the transitory compromises negotiated routinely by the legislators. The usual presumption of a rational basis for challenged legislation was
inapplicable, Justice Harlan noted, because the inchoate principle of marital
privacy is subsumable under the concept of privacy in the home. 9 His Poe
opinion suggests that the most private intimacies of family life traditionally
protected by the government, should continue to be so protected, absent some
pressing justification for reasonable interference. Marital sexual privacy is also
embraced by the broader principle limiting the extent to which a political
body can experiment to the detriment of individuals' personality and dignity.90
Justice Harlan's views illustrate how a moral right justifying a novel ruling
can become established as a principle of constitutional law.91
84. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499-502 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring); Poe
v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522-55 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
85. 367 U.S. at 548 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
86. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
87. Id. at 548.
88. Id. at 552.
89. Id. at 551.
90. This general principle of constitutional law explains and justifies both the Court's
previous ruling in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 546 (1942) (Jackson,
J., concurring), and Justice Harlan's proposed case rulings in the birth control cases viz., the
state's intolerable intrusion into a married couple's intimate sexual life abridged the kind of
liberties "that require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their
abridgement .... " 367 U.S. at 543.
91. MacCormick has described the process with characteristic clarity:
[W]hen we ask what gives a principle [constitutional] quality we must give the answer
in terms of its actual or potential explanatory and justificatory function in relation to
[constitutional] law as already established, that is in relation to established rules of

law ....
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The right of marital privacy was viewed less favorably by Justice Black in
his Griswold v. Connecticut92 dissent. He wrote, "I like my privacy as well as
the next one, but I am nevertheless compelled to admit that government has a
right to invade it unless prohibited by some specific constitutional provision." 93
Similarly, Learned Hand believed that
[j]udges are seldom content merely to annul the particular solution
efore them; they do not, indeed they may not, say that taking all things
into consideration, the legislator's solution is too strong for the judicial
stomach. On the contrary they wrap up their veto in a protective veil of
adjectives such as "arbitrary," "artificial," "normal," "reasonable," "inherently," "fundamental," or "essential," whose office usually, though
quite innocently, is to disguise what they are doing and impute to it a
derivation far more impressive than their personal preferences, which
are all that in fact lie behind the decisions. 94
Contrary to the beliefs of Justice Black and Learned Hand, nothing in the
Constitution prevents a judge from expressing personal preferences consistent
with a ruling, as long as the ruling is otherwise validly justified on conventional
grounds independent of personal preferences. Justice Harlan, a disciplined
judge, recognized
that judicial restraint is not accomplished by Justice Black's
"hollow" 95 formulas. Rather, judicial restraint is achieved through respect for
history and recognition of society's basic values. 90
Judge Hand also asked whether judges should be "arbiters of all political
authority in the nation with a discretion to act or not, as they please." 97 The
question is misleading. Judges do not have discretion to act as they please, but
must justify their decisions in accordance with standards which constrain their
discretion. A judge is obligated to employ accepted canons of legal reasoning
and to consider the text of the Constitution, its structure, the framers' intent,
precedent, notions of formal justice, federalism, the separation of powers, state
action constraints, rules of justiciability, and the institutional factors of a representative democracy, including basic societal values. Judges, therefore, may not
act as they please, since they are expected to persuade the public that case
rulings depend upon legitimate sources of law.
Under the conventional approach to constitutional law described herein,
Does this involve drawing a sharp disjunction between the principles of law and

moral and political principles? Yes and no. It involves asserting that there really is a
difference between principles which are and those which are not legal, subject to an
intermediate terra incognita of [inchoate] principles struggling for legal recognition,

[such as the constitutional right recognized in Griswold] .... It does not involve the
assertion that a principle which is a legal principle thereby stops being a moral or
political principle...."
See N. MAcCoRmcg, supra note 4, at 238.

92. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 510 (Black, J., dissenting).
Id. at 513 n.5 (quoting L. HANm, THE BILL or RIGurs 70 (1958)).
381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id.
L. H.,
THE BIL OF RIGHTs 15 (1968).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol35/iss2/3

18

Leedes: Reasonable Expectations and the Concept of Due Process Law
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXV

Roe v. Wade98 is a classic example of excessive judicial partisanship and
activism. Justice Black's and Judge Hand's warnings about abuses of judicial
power went unheeded. In its rush to judgment, the Court overlooked tradition, consensus, the framer's intent, the constraints of federalism, and the requirements of a principled method of formal justice. The bridge between the
politically controversial case and previous precedent did not span the distance.
Instead, the newly created right to an abortion appeared to depend solely on the
will of undisciplined judges. Because the nation's moral consensus was in flux,
such judicial intervention was premature and inadequately justified.
In pursuit of a new vision of social justice, the Roe Court distorted precedent to justify its intensified level of scrutiny. The dictum in Eisenstadt v.
Baird99 planted to help Justice Blackmun write his Roe opinion.10 was something of a cheat. Not even the Griswold decision supported the holding in Roe,
since the right of marital privacy in matters concerning the use of contraceptives did not clearly encompass the pregnant female's right to an abortion.
In fact, because the level of scrutiny required in Roe was far more exacting
than the level of scrutiny in Griswold and other precedent,0 1 Roe appears out
of line, hardly based upon widely shared values giving rise to a litigant's
reasonable expectations of substantive justice.
The day soon may come when a larger part of the country is more sympathetic to the plight of the pregnant female who desires an abortion. The Court
did not speed the day. The Roe decision, in effect, was judicial legislation
which substituted an authoritarian ethic for the judgment of politically accountable officials. Conventional theory can survive the Roe Court's distortion
of the Griswold precedent. 10 2 There is, however, a need for a methodology that
organizes the Court's substantive due process doctrine. Nevertheless, an undisciplined Court makes the task of its apologists arduous.

98. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
99. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). Justice Brennan referred to "the right of the individual, married
or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Id. at 453.
100. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 175-76 (1979).
101. See Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920,

928-30 (1973).
102. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), was decided on the
principle that "[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival
of the race," id. at 541, and that once a human being is sterilized, it is "to his irreparable
injury." See id. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), was a very controversial decision
which emphasized the marital relationship rather than the birth control aspects of the case.
Id. at 484-86. Yet, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), Justice Brennan made the
gratuitous statement that the "individual" has a right, "married or single to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child." Id. at 453 (emphasis in original). This dictum
paved the way for Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1978), and Justice Blackmun's addendum that
the heavy responsibilities and burdens of parenthood make parental control over the timing
and size of the family important. Id. at 153. Thus, the Skinner principle was unpacked for a
new and different journey in Roe, one which certainly justifies Ronald Dworkin's statement
that principles are not "a fixed set of standards." R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SEuousLy 76

(1978).
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PART

V:

DISCIPLINED DUE PROCESS METHODOLOGY

While some complexities in the substantive due process doctrine are unavoidable, the Court's rigid tiers of scrutiny create unnecessary problems. The
United States v. CaroleneProducts Co.'0 3 footnote led to two tiers of scrutiny,10 4
then apparently three, 05 as if the proper level of scrutiny could be triggered by
a mechanical formula. Substantial remnants of this method still survive in the
equal protection cases. There is, however, no excuse for its continued survival in
substantive due process cases.
Balancing
The methodology that should structure the Court's discretion in due process cases to implement the reasonable expectation standard was described by
Justice Harlan. 06 He focused on
the nature of the individual interest affected, the extent to which it is
affected, the rationality of the connection between legislative means and
purpose, the existence of alternative means for effectuating the purpose,
and the degree of confidence we may have that the statute reflects the
for the purpose that would legitimately support the
legislative concern
07
means chosen.
Although each substantive due process case involves moral and political issues,
the factors identified by Justice Harlan transform the ultimate moral and
political questions into technical legal questions. For example, "the nature of
the individual interest affected" refers only to interests of constitutional significance. An examination of "the extent to which [the interest] is affected"' 08
does not focus upon moral or political issues. Similarly, "the rationality of the
connection between legislative means and purpose"' 09 provokes technical
questions about efficacy, logical relationships, and the scope of unreviewable
governmental discretion. Clearly, when the government's policy is challenged,
"the existence of alternative means for effectuating the purpose,"" 0 is a factor
that helps the Court compare the incremental benefits of the policy with the
incremental costs of and interference with individual liberties. This evaluation
does not focus solely upon moralistic considerations. The final factor in Justice
Harlan's analysis considers the genuineness of the government's articulated
purpose." 1 Again, statutory construction and inquiry into the legislature's
motives are techniques rarely used by moralists.
103. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
104. Developments in the Law - Equal Protection, 82 HAav. L. REv. 1065 (1969).
105. See generally Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term -Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrineon a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAv. L.

Rav. 1 (1972).
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 259 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in result).
Id. at 260.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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A court applying this technical balancing test examines the operational disruption that may result from a decision adverse to the government. Some of
the technical questions presented by this inquiry include whether federalism
or separation of powers concerns are adversely affected; whether the law's
continuity will be interrupted; whether the Court will be entering into a
delicate area of controversy where it lacks information, expertise, selfconfidence, and the public confidence; whether disruption to governmental
operations will occur; and, whether the Court is interfering with the political
process and the often necessary compromises reached by political actors. These
are not questions entertained by the moral philosopher who rates compromise
low on his scale of values. Rather, these are questions pertinent to the resolution of constitutional isues.
When moral questions have only secondary importance, and political
questions are reserved for officials accountable to the public, the danger that a
decision imposes a judge's personal ethics upon society diminishes. Thus, the
Court's technical institutional limitations, not the ultimate right answer, often
become paramount. For example, assume that it is immoral to force an involuntarily committed patient to ingest anti-psychotic drugs with dangerous
side effects.112 Nevertheless, if the patient's state-employed physicians determine that the drugs reduce the patient's propensity for violence, and that the
risks of side effects are slight, the Court might reduce its level of scrutiny.
Otherwise, the Court becomes involved in the day-by-day management of mental
patients, taxing its resources in areas where it lacks expertise. It is thus possible
that a variation of a deferential rational basis test will be applied by the Court,
even though basic liberties are burdened.
The interests of mental patients in freedom of movement and bodily security, however fundamental, should not always trigger the least burdensome
alternative approach when the Court lacks the expertise to evaluate the risks
entailed by medical treatment. Moreover, an examination of whether the
government has a compelling interest in protecting other patients is a crude
approach to a polycentric issue involving medical judgment. The law cannot
demand more than those subject to the law can deliver, and physicians cannot
deliver more than their professional judgment. This is not to say that professional judgment is immune from judicial review. Rather, unless the physician
acts outside his area of competence, the Court is not always in a position to presume medical judgment violates core liberties.
Each factor in a multi-factor balancing test affects the significance of other
factors, possibly making one factor more or less relevant. Obviously, the Court's
scrutiny will become more exacting as the burden on constitutionally protected
interests increases. 113 On the other hand, the greater the dislocation likely to be
caused by a ruling adverse to government, the more circumspect the Court

112. See Mills v. Rogers, 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982) (Court granted review "to determine
whether involuntarily committed mental patients have a constitutional right to refuse treatment with anti-psychotic drugs," but did not reach the merits).
113.

See Leedes, The Revival of Interest in Justice Harlan's Flexible Due Process

Balancing Approach, 19 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 737, 761-62 (1982).
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should be. Circumspection was evident in Youngberg v. Romeo,1 4 where state
interference with an institutionalized person's core liberties of movement and
bodily security survived a deferential test. Romeo, while a patient in a state
mental hospital, was forceably restrained. The Court was understandably unwilling to allow a jury to second guess professional judgment, an intrusion
which would disrupt the institution's ongoing internal operations. Thus the
remedy requested by a challenger of governmental policy, here a damages
award, may also affect the Court's balancing process." 51 For example, when an
injunctive remedy is requested, the anticipated operational disruption will be a
paramount consideration.
The piecemeal development of the substantive due process agenda includes
case rulings that specify proper levels of judicial review." 6 A level of judicial
scrutiny created by a series of cases "grows slowly by gradual accretion from the
resolution of specific problems.""11 The Court's decisions may initially appear
unprincipled, but principles will become evident as rulings accumulate. These
rulings must be organized and explained. Explanations, however, are not always
immediately self-evident when a new trend of case rulings interrupts a stable
line of growth.
When a new trend is finally recognized after some initial groping and
spontaneous evolution, it becomes a working hypothesis requiring continuous
testing in the laboratory of the law."18 Eventually the principle will solidify the
developing law. 19 The new principle will create reasonable expectations just
as the developing case law protected other reasonable expectations. Judges are
often unaware of what they are doing or where the evolving law is taking the
courts. The process of groping for principles to justify a series of rulings has
been described as "a sort of connect-the-dots exercise." 120 Nevertheless, the
painstaking process of groping for justice is preferable to rigid levels of scrutiny
which do not reflect society's reasonable expectations.

114. 102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982).
115. See Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term - Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 I-IRv.

L. REv. 27-28 (1979).
116. Compare Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) with Williamson v. Lee Optical
Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
117. Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 182 (3d Cir. 1980) (Aldisert, J., concurring),
vacated and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982).

118. Id. (quoting M. SMrrH, JurIsPRuDEN

E 21

(1909)).

119. In Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982), Justice White attempted to justify
the Court's inability to adhere to a consistent line of growth in the cases dealing with
alienage restrictions in public employment. He wrote, "but to say that the decisions do not
fall into a neat pattern is not to say that they fall into no pattern. In fact," he added, "they
illustrate a not unusual characteristic of legal development: broad principles are articulated,

narrowed when applied to new contexts, and finally replaced when the distinctions they
rely upon are no longer tenable." Id. at 436.
120. 644 F.2d 147, 182 (3d Cir. 1980) (Aldisert, J., concurring), quoting Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, Foreward: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV.
5, 32 (1978) (citing Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. RV.
349, 351-52 (1974)).
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Balancing Versus Fixed Levels of Scrutiny
A multifactor, flexible balancing test is sensitive to the dynamics of the
reasonable expectations standard. A flexible test should avoid excessive reliance
upon ambiguous "buzz words," 12 1 such as "compelling" and "substantial"

(government interests) which can mean all things to all people1 22 and different
things to each judge. Such a loosely structured yet disciplined methodology
compares well to a rigidly dichotomous test that is either "'strict' in theory
and fatal in fact" 2 3 or excessively deferential.
The Court's experiments with fixed tiers of scrutiny led to a frantic search
for fundamental rights. But as Romeo 24 indicates, substantial burdens on core
liberties do not necessarily trigger intrusive judicial review, and the Court's
lower level of scrutiny may result in deference to officials. The circumstances of
each case affect the Court's level of scrutiny. Moreover, all types of governmental restrictions on rights are not alike. Thus, the appropriate scrutiny,
whether strict, moderately exacting, careful, somewhat deferential or very
deferential is not, and should not be determined by technical conceptions unrelated to circumstances. 12
The conceptual neatness of a rigidly tiered system can be misleading. For
example, the abstract right of privacy subsumes countless concrete rights, not all
of which are equally constitutionally significant. Thus, in the abortion cases, a
parental notification requirement triggers a slightly different level of scrutiny
than a parental consent requirement. 26 A spousal notification requirement
may require yet another level of scrutiny.1 27 Obviously, not every case involving
disputes about fundamental rights necessarily triggers the same fatal scrutiny
2
applied in Roe. 8
Personal autonomy issues are not resolvable solely by mechantistic concepts
of judicial review,12 9 especially during the throes of a sexual revolution. For
example, in abortion funding debates, some argue that a pregnant female has a
duty to protect prenatal life, but would not extend this duty to victims of rape
and women whose lives are seriously endangered by the pregnancy. Logic is
often inadequate to test such distinctions. When ambivalent human feelings
are involved, slogans about neutral principles also have limited usefulness. No
121. 644 F.2d at 182.
122. Id.
123. Gunther, supra note 105. at 8.
124. 102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982).
125. For example, although justice Harlan often applied a compelling interest test in
first amendment cases, "his balancing typically entailed a fair and careful evaluation of the
asserted state justifications for impinging upon first amendment interests." Gunther, In Search
of Judicial Quality on a Changing Court: The Case of Justice Powell, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1001,
1006 (1972).
126. Compare Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) with H. L.
v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
127. See Scheinberg v. Smith, 659 F.2d 476, 483-85 (5th Cir. 1981).
128. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
129. The reasonable expectations standard, often transcending the judge's volition, illustrates that legal reasoning is inadequate to dispose of hard cases; although theories of legal
reasoning and constitutional law are usually mutually reinforcing, one is incomplete without
the other. See N. MACCORMICK, supra note 4, at 265.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1983

23

Florida Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [1983], Art. 3
1983]

REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS/DUE PROCESS OF LAW

slogan about human rights represents the Constitution's answer to controversies involving basic human instincts.
The legislature is often insensitive to the plight of the pregnant female. On
the other hand, the legislature might be concerned that many indigent females
are unable to evaluate impartially society's interest in prenatal life. The government's use of economic pressure through denial of abortion funding reflects an
official belief that a pregnant female is not responsible enough to make the
right moral decision on her own.130 Because a flexible due process balancing
test considers all legitimate competing interests, including those of moralists
who object to abortion, it is an appropriate methodology in hard cases. The
Court's alternative is a neurotic preoccupation with artificial typologies.
The Court was "uncertain and adrift"'131 when burdens on fundamental
interests always triggered strict scrutiny. It is less likely that a person's reasonable expectation will be characterized as a fundamental right if the result is
the demise of a network of state laws.' 32 Conversely, more fundamental rights
will be recognized when the ascription does not interfere with the delicate task
of balancing competing interests.
A court required to balance competing interests after the legislature has
canvassed the subject is always faced with a delicate task. 33 A sober second
evaluation by an impartial tribunal, however, is desirable when evidence
suggests a serious political malfunction has occurred. Often, the Court's balancing of competing interests is different than the legislatures'. A legislative compromise appeasing special interest groups might fail to assign the requisite
weight to constitutionally significant interests. Long after the legislation is
enacted, changed conditions may generate unprecedented reasonable expectations. Moreover, the legislature's judgment may have been a response to public
hysteria, panic, or obsession. An ad hoc balancing test might require the
Court to substitute its judgment for that of the legislature when the legislature
acts with little or no deliberation. Under these circumstances, the Supreme
Court has a duty to discern the constitutional balance "which our Nation, built
upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between
that liberty and the demands of organized society."'8 4 The constitutional
balance is the source and product of the reasonable expectations of fair-minded
people.
The vague contours of a reasonable expectation standard dependent on empirical data create questions without permanently settled answers. For example,
how long must a value endure before it is recognized as a constitutionally significant reasonable expectation? What percentage of the nation's population
must cherish a particular value before it becomes a reasonable expectation
powerful enough to trump political outcomes? On what side does the Court
130. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 US. 464 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 US. 292 (1980)
(Court upheld funding discrimination, which comparatively disadvantaged indigent females
who desired abortions).
131. Gunther, supra note 105, at 1.
132. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 US. 374, 399 (Powell, J., concurring).
133. See L. HAND, supra note 97, at 69.

134. Id. at 68-78.
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throw its weight when the country is polarized as in 1954 when Brown v. Board
of Education"35 was decided? Further, to what extent can the Court uphold
reasonable expectations which are, in its view, becoming morally regressive?
The difficulty of these and other questions 136 suggests that the Court must
eschew rigid formulas and platitudinous generalizations when it decides hard
cases. The Supreme Court, although not infallible, is capable of identifying
society's reasonable expectations. Even Learned Hand wrote, "[j]udges are
perhaps more apt than legislators to take a long view" although he did add
that this "varies so much with the individual that generalization is
37
hazardous.",
PART

VI:

THE CHALLENGE OF DUE PROCESS METHODOLOGY

In a rapidly changing, dispute-ridden society, a court of nine independent
justices will not always produce a consistent body of case law. When logic is
the Court-watcher's sole basis for comment, the Supreme Court's cases appear
a doctrinal mess.138 The critical observer, however, cannot fairly accuse the
Court of abusing judicial power when the Court conscientiously exercises its
detached judgment and provides a valid justification for each ruling. Conventional theory attempts to explain that the apparently incoherent and
contradictory case law has an organizing matrix.
A flexible but structured approach, such as Justice Harlan's, provides the
basis for a descriptive and modestly prescriptive theory of law enabling the
legal profession to understand the due process concept. There are of course,
several problems associated with ad hoc balancing. Balancing tends to focus
on the particular factors in a given case. 39 Even excessively particularized
opinions, however, can congeal over time into broad rules of general application that lead to predictable results. Toward that end, when judges engage
in ad hoc balancing, they should articulate the criteria that guide resolution of
value conflicts. 14 0 A judge's opinion, when practicable, should conjoin the case
ruling with more general principles and standards. This is the objective
challenging a court that adopts the flexible due process methodology. The
Supreme Court has a duty to define the contours of rights that it is in a position
135. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
136. The reasonable expectation standard is not always easily applied. For example,
assume that a state statute prohibits mutilation of the American flag. Mutilation of the
flag in order to express hatred of the United States is an act presumably unacceptable to the
controlling majorities in virtually all American communities. On the other hand, it is
arguable that the same controlling majorities strongly support the concept of freedom of
speech. They would accept any plausible interpretation by the Court of the scope of the
first and fourteenth amendments as applied in a flag mutilation case. In this situation, the
Court has substantial discretion to balance the competing interests and resolve the ambivalence.
137. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
138. Leedes, The Supreme Court Mess, 57 TEx. L. Rav. 1361 (1979).
139. As Gerald Gunther writes, "[a] Supreme Court opinion should strive for more than
"fair balancing" in the individual case before the Court. It should also provide the maximum
guidance possible for lower courts and litigants. An excessively particularized opinion lacks
that quality." Gunther, supra note 125, at 1026 (footnote omitted).
140. Id. at 1026-27.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1983

25

Florida Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [1983], Art. 3
1983]

REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS/DUE PROCESS OF LAW

to protect unconditionally. Since the scope, content and weight of rights frequently expand and contract, continuous clarification of the law is essential.
Otherwise, the judicial system will produce a bevy of disconnected case rulings
inadequate to meet the needs of lawyers.
Depending on the nature of the right, over-inclusive prophylactic rules
and presumptions might be necessary to delineate the line between state
power and individual rights, and prevent any chilling effect produced by the
unpredictability of balancing. 141 On the other hand, depending on the right at
42
issue, it may be appropriate to presume governmental action constitutional2
Unfortunately, rules and constitutional presumptions provide either too much
or too little protection. 43 In such situations, reformation of rules and presumptions pursuant to a disciplined methodology is often warranted. Determining the appropriate balance between excessive particularization and amorphous
generalization is difficult. A series of cases can produce rules of judicial administration that strike a manageable balance among competing interests, but
ad hoc balancing is still often necessary to fill in gaps'" between the rules.
A key question is always whether an equal protection 4 5 or substantive due
process case requires the risks associated with judicial discretion. In due process
cases, Justice Harlan recognized that judicial discretion is "more conducive to
judicial restraint than an approach couched in slogans .... ,,146 While stressing
restraint, 47 Justice Harlan also realized that due regard for an individual's
reasonable expectations occasionally requires the risk-laden flexible balancing
approach. Risks are taken in order to protect the individual from the political
141. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US. 254 (1964) ("actual malice" rule
in libel cases).
142. In the Pentagon Papers case, New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 US. 713
(1971), Justice Harlan argued that the first amendment protection afforded by courts must
take into account "the proper compass of the President's foreign relations power." Id. at 757.
Thus, he would not presume in all cases that a prior restraint is unconstitutional.
143. The Court's incitement test in subversive advocacy cases is not clearly designed to
take into account the gravity of the harm that is advocated. Thus, in some cases, this test
might provide too little or too much first amendment protection. See Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 US. 444 (1969).
144. See, e.f., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (Justice Harlan combined structured,
ad hoc balancing with first amendment definitional balancing tests). In Globe Newsletter Co. v.
Superior Court, 102 S. Ct. 2613 (1982), the Supreme Court noted that case-by-case balancing
is required to determine whether a closure of a criminal trial to the press is justified. Even
though the state's interest in protecting the physical and professional well-being of a teenage
rape victim is ordinarily compelling, the trial judge must in each case take into account "the
minor victim's age, psychological maturity, and understanding, the nature of the crime, the

desires of the victim, and the interests of parents and relatives." Id. at 2621.
145. The cases that deal with barriers to a candidate's right of access to the ballot illustrate the frequent need to adopt a case-by-case approach. In Clements v. Fashing, 102 S. Ct.
2836 (1982), the plurality opinion indicated that an extremely deferential level of review is
applicable. Even Justice Brennan, dissenting in Fashing, conceded that strict scrutiny may be
improper when public employees are adversely affected by ballot access requirements. Id. at
2850. In short, generalizations about levels of scrutiny in these cases are hazardous if not
worthless. As Justice Stevens noted in Fashing,"as in so many areas of the law, it is important
to consider each case individually." Id.
146. Williams v. Illinois, 899 U.S. 235, 260 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
147. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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malfunction of democracy run riot. Democracy is not the ultimate end of our
government. Rather, it is a means for working out, under law, a reasonable,
socially acceptable relationship between individuals' liberties and the community's welfare. Thus, there is a need for a constitutional requirement of due
process that limits the power of elected representatives.
The Court's critics claim that the due process concept is too "evocative,"'' 48 and that "a principled approach to judicial enforcement of the Constitution's open-ended provisions cannot be developed ....
"-149 Article III imperatives, however, obligate the Court to develop a credible theory of legitimate
judicial intervention. Although the reasonable expectation standard provides
a guide, judicial efforts to apply the reasonable expectation standard occasionally appear as creative groping for a plausible justification in due process
cases. 150 Even the Supreme Court may be uncertain about the meaning of due
process of law. Chief Justice Marshall, mindful of similar challenges, wrote:
The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because it
approaches the confines of the constitution. We cannot pass it by because it is doubtful. With whatever difficulties, a case may be attended,
we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right to
decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that
which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution. Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid, but we
cannot avoid them. All we can do is, to exercise our best judgment, and
conscientiously to perform our duty. 151
The litigant has a reasonable expectation that the Supreme Court will perform
its duty. When it does not, the Court itself violates due process of law.
CONCLUSION

Our deeply felt values are conditioned by the world around us. We express
these personal feelings very imperfectly. Judges share this inadequacy. A
conscientious judge must articulate and justify any ruling which is a product
of his intuition. Case justifications are suspect when they do not conform to
the public's reasonable expectations. The public's expectations add up to social
pressures which influence the judge, channel his discretion, rule out certain
justifications, and produce the law. In this respect the people are both ruled
and rulers, and courts are not immune from their powerful influence.
148. J. ELY, supra note 79, at 18.
149. Id. at 41.
150. Judge Aldisert writes: "The Common Law 'creeps from point to point, testing each
step' and grows slowly by gradual accretion from the resolution of specific problems." Romeo
v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 182 (3d Cir. 1980) (Aldisert, J., concurring) (quoting A. WHrmHEAD, ADVENTURES OF IDEAS, ch. 2, § 6 (1967)).
151. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1983

27

